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Abstract
Duverger claimed more than 50 years ago that the number of candidates in elections
should be a function of electoral rules. Both his ￿law￿and ￿hypothesis￿suggest the number
of candidates vying for seats in elections to be tightly linked to characteristics of the elec-
toral process such as its degree of proportionality and the presence of runo⁄s. Here we test
the validity of Duverger￿ s claim using data from municipal elections in Brazil. Our study
di⁄ers from others in the ￿eld in two important dimensions. First, by using municipal data
we avoid the usual problems that plague statistical analysis using cross-country data. Sec-
ondly, we have a truly exogenous source of variation due to a change in electoral legislation
introduced by the constitutional reform of 1988: simple plurality remained the rule only
in municipalities with less than 200,000 voters, and a second-ballot became mandatory for
the others above that threshold. This allows for a neat identi￿cation strategy using panel
data. Our main ￿nding is that elections with runo⁄s lure greater numbers of candidates in
municipalities with su¢ ciently high levels of heterogeneity.
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11 Introduction
That di⁄erent electoral rules may yield di⁄erent outcomes in terms of number of candidates and
parties is a well known proposition in social sciences. More than ￿fty years ago, Duverger (1954)
gave law status to this idea in a two-fold statement that Riker (1982) latter dubbed Duverger￿ s
Law, namely, ￿that simple-majority single ballot system favors the two-party system￿ , and
Duverger￿ s Hypothesis - that ￿the simple majority system with second-ballot and proportional
representation favors multipartyism￿ . Since then, a large body of research has put these claims
to test, with the majority of the papers upholding Duverger￿ s informal claims.
In this paper, we use data from municipal elections in Brazil to test if the number of
candidates in mayoral elections is sensitive to the existence of runo⁄1. Our paper di⁄ers from
others in the literature because we are able to explore the change in Brazilian electoral law
that accompanied the Constitutional reform of 1988. Before the reform, mayoral elections in
all municipalities were governed by simple plurality. With the new law municipalities with
more than 200,000 eligible voters were required to adopt a two-ballot system2. We thus have
a quasi-natural experiment not found in other studies. Our identi￿cation strategy consists in
exploring this exogenous change in legislation in a panel set framework. The fact that we have
variations in both the time and cross-section dimensions generated by a shift in electoral law
allows us to overcome endogeneity bias problems plaguing similar empirical works.
Though ￿rst elevated to law status by Duverger, the idea that di⁄erent electoral rules a⁄ect
the decisions of the political elite (say to form parties or enter a race) and the way individuals
cast their votes was already being discussed long before. For instance, as quoted in Riker
(1982), Henry Droop, an English advocate of proportional representation already claimed as
early as 1881 that ￿the only explanation which seems to me to account for the two-party
system in the United States, United Kingdom, etc is that the two opposing parties into which
we ￿nd politicians divided in each of these countries have been formed and are kept together by
majority voting￿ . It is indeed no surprise that people begun to think about the consequences
of di⁄erent electoral rules when ￿rst discussing them in the late nineteenth century. Referring
speci￿cally to what latter became to be known as Duverger￿ s Hypothesis, Holcombe (1910)
1In most cases, including Brazil, elections with runo⁄s are those in which the two most voted candidates have
to dispute a second round if none of them obtains at least 50% of votes in the ￿rst stage.
2As in the literature, we use runo⁄ and two-ballot interchangeably.
2long ago argued that ￿one e⁄ect of the second ballot is to foster the independent existence of
minor groups￿ .
Duverger￿ s propositions spawned two strands of research. On the theoretical front, a set of
studies using game-theoretic approaches and endogenizing politicians￿entry decision con￿rmed
Duverger￿ s suspicions that two candidate elections are indeed more likely under plurality rule
and runo⁄s. Osborne and Slivinski (1996), for instance3, focus on politicians￿strategic con-
siderations. More precisely, they show the combination of parameters yielding two-candidate
elections is more stringent under runo⁄ than plurality. They demonstrate that whereas in
runo⁄ systems an upper bound on the size of spoils of o¢ ce is needed to avoid more than two
candidates running for the seat, no such condition is necessary under plurality. Other papers,
such as Feddersen (1992) point to voters￿strategic behavior, stressing their unwillingness to
squander their votes on ￿hopeless￿ candidates. Strategic voting is also emphasized in Cox
(1997). Throughout his book, the author forcefully argues that votes get concentrated on a
small number of candidates in one-seat and simple plurality elections (as opposed to propor-
tional and runo⁄ systems) because of strategic voting and strategic support by political elites.
The argument is similar to Feddersen￿ s: people avoid wasting their vote on hopeless candidates
if the rule is ￿rst-past-the-pole, and so does the political elite having to allocate scarce resources
to ￿nance and endorse candidacies.
There are other two reasons why runo⁄ elections may end up with more candidates in the
￿rst round when compared to simple plurality. First, in a runo⁄, politicians do not have to be
the ￿rst-past-the-pole in the ￿rst round to wind up as the ultimate winner, a fact that increases
his willingness to participate. Second, some candidates have incentives to enter the race even
if they do not perceive a great chance of arriving among the ￿rst two because by garnering
some unexpectedly high voters￿support in the ￿rst round, politicians may be able to sell their
endorsement to the front runners at a higher price. Clearly, this motivation for entry is absent
in simple plurality elections.
On the empirical front, the e⁄ort has been to investigate the existence of a consistent
relationship between district size and/or the presence of a runo⁄ stage and the number of
candidates, mostly using cross-country data. In an important contribution, Lijphart (1994)
3The ￿rst paper addressing candidates entry decision is Palfrey (1984). Other studies relating number of
candidates and electoral rules are Cox (1987, 1990).
3presents systematic evidence supporting the idea that the level of proportionality embedded in
the various electoral rules signi￿cantly a⁄ects the degree of multi-candidate competition.
Other studies criticize Lijphart￿ s ￿institutional view￿ arguing that the number of par-
ties/candidates should be related to societal cleavages and not to arti￿cial institutional design
characteristics4. We ￿nd hard to believe in the pure social cleavages argument, advocated
by some sociologists, because within the same country elections governed by di⁄erent politi-
cal rules (lower house under proportional and upper house under plurality, for instance) have
very di⁄erent number of candidates, as demonstrated by Cox (1997). Apparently, consensus
is building around a more nuanced view combining both the institutional and the sociological
currents. This hybrid view suggests the ￿permissiveness￿embedded in proportional and runo⁄
elections should be important to explain the number of candidates only insofar as there is a
reasonable degree of heterogeneity in society. Similarly, heterogeneity should not be important
in explaining the number of candidates if the voting structure leaves no room for it to manifest
itself.
Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994), for example, using cross-country data provide evidence
that it is the interaction of institutional design (district size, in their paper) and social cleavages
that matters, not any of each separately. In the same vein, Amorim Neto and Cox (1997)
and Golder (2006) ￿nd a positive association between the number of presidential candidates
and runo⁄ dummy multiplied by an index of ethnic fragmentation using cross-country data.
Importantly, in his paper neither the runo⁄ variable nor the ethnic fragmentation one are by
themselves statistically signi￿cant.
Regarding speci￿cally the e⁄ect of runo⁄s, Wright and Riker (1989) use data from Demo-
cratic primaries held in southern states between 1950 and 1982 to investigate whether those
held under simple plurality entailed less candidates than the ones employing the two-ballot
system. They ￿nd that the average number of candidates in plurality primaries was less than
3, whereas the ￿gure for runo⁄ primaries was above 5. Controlling for other factors, such as
the presence of the incumbent, the conditional di⁄erence in the number of candidates falls to
2, but the coe¢ cient on the runo⁄ variable remains highly statistically signi￿cant. Wright and
Riker is a highly cited paper lending credence to Duverger￿ s Hypothesis, but despite its clear
￿nding it has an important weakness: it implicitly assumes the decision of adopting plurality
4See the discussion in Cox (1997).
4or runo⁄ to be exogenous. Unfortunately, it is possible that Southern States self-selected into
this two categories of ballot system. If unobservable characteristics a⁄ect both the decision
to opt for runo⁄ primaries and politicians motivations to enter the race, then the estimated
coe¢ cient is not re￿ ecting the pure e⁄ect of the voting system on the number of candidates.
Jones (1999) also tests the in￿ uence of runo⁄s on the number of candidates using cross-
country data from presidential elections. Using di⁄erent econometric methods and samples
he ￿nds that runo⁄ elections have on average approximately one more candidate than simple
majority ones. As Wright and Riker (1989) he too ￿nds an important and negative incumbency
e⁄ect5. The problem is again endogeneity bias, since the author has no exogenous source of
variation in the ballot structure. Furthermore, the fact he uses a cross-country dataset probably
aggravates the selection bias problem (since it is expected that institutional characteristics vary
more strongly among countries than within sub-national units).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce our dataset and
the identi￿cation strategy we think properly addresses the endogeneity problems mentioned
above. In section 3, we present our basic results, and section 4 concludes.
2 Data and identi￿cation strategy
In Brazil, mayoral elections take place every four years. After redemocratization in 1985, six
free mayoral elections took place in 1985, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004. We have data for
the last ￿ve of them. In the 1988 election, the prevailing legislation mandated simple plurality
for all municipalities across the country, independent of electorate size. But, crucially for our
identi￿cation strategy, the Constitutional reform - approved at the end of that same year -
imposed a strict rule: elections in municipalities with more than 200,000 registered voters were
required to have a second ballot. Below this threshold, there was no change in the simple
plurality rule. Hence, in all subsequent mayoral elections there have been instances of both
simple majority and runo⁄ contests. Table 1 below summarizes the information on ballot
structure for all ￿ve elections in our sample. The evolution in the number of elections through
time is the combined result of increased data availability and a rise in the number of new
5More recent work by Gyourko and Ferreira (2006) also attest to the importance of incumbency. They show
using a discontinuity regression method that incumbents are much more likely to get reelected.
5municipalities during the nineties.
Table 1: Ballot structure in municipal elections
1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
Plurality 2536 3637 5356 5502 5490
Runo⁄ 0 30 47 57 68
Total 2536 3667 5403 5559 5558
The panel data structure and the law shift at the end of 1988 allows us to explore both
cross-section and time-series variations in order to identify the e⁄ect of runo⁄s on the number of
competing candidates. Identi￿cation thus comes from two sources: di⁄erences in electoral rules
across municipalities in a same election, and di⁄erences arising from municipalities changing
status between elections. Further, controlling for ￿xed e⁄ects in a difs-in-difs speci￿cation as
we do considerably diminishes the chances we run into omitted variables bias problems.
The electoral data - number of candidates and eligible voters - comes from the Superior
Electoral Court (TSE) and Regional Electoral Courts (TREs) datasets, and the Gini coe¢ cient
at municipal level comes from the 1991 and 2000 Censuses. Table 2 below presents some
summary statistics. Unfortunately, for the 1988 and 1992 elections the availability of data
is more scarce than for the more recent elections. Moreover, the municipalities for which
they are available do not perfectly match. This is important because it means the number of
observations in the difs-in-difs regressions will be smaller than in any particular election. For
instance, the municipalities appearing in both the 1988 and 1992 elections add up to 2283, less
than the ￿gure for 1988 alone (2536, see table 1).
6Table 2: Summary statistics
1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 Total
Candidates 3.068 2.908 2.839 2.706 2.827 2.840
(1.351) (1.209) (1.221) (1.059) (1.113) (1.176)
Electorate/10,000 19.224 17.105 18.352 19.517 21.556 19.317
(136.577) (110.852) (119.652) (124.387) (134.808) (125.281)





Standard errors in parentheses
We asssess the role of the runo⁄variable by itself, as suggested by ￿pure institutional view￿ ,
and also its interaction with a measure of social cleavage as suggested in more recent studies.
We use the local Gini inequality index as a proxy for social cleavage. Inequality in income is
arguably a reasonable indication of di⁄erent public policy views and political demands in a
country with no clear ethnic divisions but extreme disparities in income such as Brazil6. It
is also important to control for electorate size - even if this is not common in the literature -
because the rule establishing the second ballot is a (discontinuous) function of this variable.
Hence, not adding electorate size may lead to an omitted variable bias if, for any reason, the
number of candidates is a function of it.
In all pooled regressions we control for State and time dummies. The more general esti-
mated model thus has the following speci￿cations in the pooled and difs-in-difs regressions,
respectively:
yit = c + ￿:Dit + ￿:Hit + ￿:Dit:Hit + ￿:Eit + Si + Tt + ￿it (1)
yit = c + Fi + ￿:Dit + ￿:Hit + ￿:Dit:Hit + ￿:Eit + ￿it (2)
6Brazil is one of the most inequal countries in the world.
7Where yit is the number of candidates in municipality i in election t; Dit assumes 1 if there
is a runo⁄ stage and 0 otherwise; Hit is the local Gini coe¢ cient; Fi is the municipality ￿xed
e⁄ect; Eit is electorate size, Si and Tt are State and time dummies, and ￿it is an error term7.
What does the raw data tell us about the number of candidates in elections with and
without a second-ballot? Table 3 below displays unconditional averages of this variable. As
can be seen, simple averages seem to support Duverger￿ s Hypothesis: the number of candidates
competing in elections where there is a runo⁄ stage is considerably greater than the number of
contendors in simple plurality elections. This di⁄erence reaches nearly 4.5 in the 1996 mayoral
election and its average is 3.5 candidates for the whole sample.
Table 3: Average number of candidates
1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 Total
Simple Plurarity 3.068 2.884 2.802 2.670 2.782 2.808
(1.351) (1.175) (1.141) (0.974) (1.014) (1.111)
Runo⁄ ￿ 5.733 7.106 6.105 6.426 6.391
(1.837) (2.189) (2.491) (2.275) (2.290)
Total 3.068 2.908 2.839 2.705 2.827 2.840
(1.351) (1.221) (1.209) (1.059) (1.113) (1.176)
Standard errors in parentheses
As we will show in the next section, the conditional runo⁄ e⁄ect is smaller than these
unconditional means suggest, but is nonetheless signi￿cant both economically and statistically.
Furthermore, it operates in a more nuanced way via its interaction with the Gini index.
We proceed as follows: ￿rst, we run pooled OLS regressions; secondly we run ￿xed e⁄ects
estimations and third, as a robustness check, we run a placebo regression in which we assume
the municipalities with runo⁄s in 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004 already played by this rule in
1988, before the law was enacted. We do this to allay fears that omitted factors correlated
with adoption are driving our ￿ndings. Therefore the outcome of this last regression will be
consistent with the others￿if they are opposite to them. Put it di⁄erently, we expect that
applying the medicine when there is no illness will not ￿cure￿the patient.
7We include an incumbent dummy for the 2000 and 2004 elections. A Constitutional amendment allowing
reelection was approved in 1997.
83 Results
We ￿rst run pooled OLS regressions lumping all elections together. This strategy does not
account for omitted time invariant unobservable characteristics at the municipal level, which
may be potentially correlated with both runo⁄ variable and number of candidates. The re-
sults appear in Table 4 below. The runo⁄ dummy is positively correlated with the dependent
variable in speci￿cations (1) and (2). Electorate size has a positive sign and its point estimate
means an increase of 100,000 voters leads to more 0.02 candidates, all else equal. Its practical
signi￿cance is hence minor. Interestingly, the sign of the runo⁄ dummy variable turns negative
after we include the interactive term Dit:Hit and is not di⁄erent from zero in the most com-
plete speci￿cation including electorate size:This is in line with several empirical papers cited
previously arguing institutional permissiveness is important when there is a reasonable degree
of heterogeneity among the electorate. As will become clear later, our panel estimations will
strenghten this e⁄ect.
The partial e⁄ect E(yit j X;D = 1) ￿ E(yit j X;D = 0) = ￿ + ￿:Hit shows the importance
of heterogeneity in assessing the e⁄ect of the runo⁄ dummy.8 Substituting the estimated
coe¢ cients from speci￿cations (3), (4) and (5) for ￿ and ￿ in the above formula, one easily sees
that E(yit j D = 1) ￿ E(yit j D = 0) has lower bounds of 0.89, 0.89 and 1.04 (using the lowest
Gini in the runo⁄ group, 0.43) and upper bounds of 4.96, 4.96 and 2.90 (using the greatest
Gini in the runo⁄ sample, 0.67), respectively. These magnitudes are signi￿cant if one recalls
the magnitude of the runo⁄ e⁄ects are 1 and 2 in Jones (1999) and Wright and Riker (1982)
papers.
Finally, the incumbent variable has the ￿wrong￿sign in the pooled regression: the presence
of a running incumbent increases the number of candidates. This variable is nevertheless only
marginally signi￿cant.
8X is a vector containg all the control variables included in each regression in Table 4.
9Table 4: Pooled OLS9
Dependent Variable: Number of Candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Runo⁄ 3.426 3.388 -6.406 -6.413 -2.329
(0.077)*** (0.077)*** (0.806)*** (0.806)*** (0.811)***
Gini 1.235 1.112 1.110 0.976
(0.138)*** (0.138)*** (0.138)*** (0.135)***






Observations 22715 22608 22608 22608 22580
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.19
Standard errors in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
We also rerun the above regression restricting our sample to include solely the municipal-
ities that appear in all elections. We do so as a robustness check and also to have a base
of comparison for the difs-in-difs regression that will follow (and include only municipalities
appearing for which we have data for more than one election). As one can see, there is little
change from the results shown in table 4.
9For the 1988 and 1992 regressions the Gini coe¢ cient employed is the one from the 1991 Census, whereas
for the 1996, 2000 and 2004 regressions the Gini comes from the 2000 Census.
10Table 5: Pooled OLS in restricted sample
Dependent Variable: Number of Candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Runo⁄ 3.320 3.272 -4.601 -4.622 -1.663
(0.107)*** (0.107)*** (1.142)*** (1.142)*** (1.126)
Gini 1.409 1.296 1.289 1.153
(0.213)*** (0.213)*** (0.213)*** (0.209)***






Observations 11415 11415 11415 11415 11397
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.17
Standard errors in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
Next we present the results from difs-in-difs regressions using pairs of elections in which the
￿rst is always 1988 (for which the rule was simple majority independent of size). The number
of observations varies in accordance with data availability (only municipalities present in both
elections of each election pair are included). The gain relative to the pooled regressions is
the inclusion of ￿xed e⁄ects and the possibility of exploring variation in the time dimension
(before/after the law shift). As far as we know, no empirical work testing the in￿ uence of
runo⁄s explores time variation controlling for ￿xed e⁄ects. The decision to include various
election pairs comes from the possibility that there is a time lag between the law change and
candidates entry decision. The last column also shows the result when we include all elections
in the panel10.
As can be seen in the Table 6, the same kind of result remains: the interactive variable is
10For the 1988/1992 pair, there is no variation in the Gini variable and thus it does not enter the regression
separetely (a perfect correlation with the ￿xed e⁄ect would result). For all other regressions we use the 1991
Gini for the 1988 election and the 2000 Gini for the rest.
11always strongly statistically signi￿cant and has a positive sign, and the runo⁄ dummy alone
has a negative coe¢ cient. The incumbency e⁄ect now has the ￿correct￿sign and is precisely
estimated. As found in other works, incumbent participation seems to discourage entry.
Looking at the estimated coe¢ cients, one can see that above a certain level of heterogeneity,
the runo⁄ e⁄ect becomes positive. Judging by the point estimate of speci￿cations (1), (2), (3)
and (4) in Table 6, this happens for Hit above 0.64, 0.56, 0.61 and 0.5911. In Table 7, we run
the same regression, but we allow for variation in the Gini index over time. As one can see,
the results are similar to those in Table 6. Moreover, this strategy also allows to include this
variable alongside the ￿xed e⁄ects. As one can see, there is no clear pattern regarding the
isolated e⁄ect of the heterogeneity variable on the number of candidates.
In sum, it is only natural that after isolating a great deal of possible common factors
a⁄ecting both runo⁄ and number of candidates variables, the impact of the former on the
latter weakens. As we condition on more variables, heterogeneity becomes more and more
important to the argument that runo⁄s yield more candidates. However, the main intuition
is unaltered: runo⁄s lead to more candidates conditional on there being a minimum level of
heterogeneity in the electorate.
11There were 68 municipalities using the second-ballot in 2000. From these, 25 had Gini indexes above 0.60.
12Table 6: Fixed E⁄ects (Gini - 1991)
Dependent Variable: Number of Candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Runo⁄ -7.369 -7.451 -6.815 -6.810
(2.640)*** (1.945)*** (1.826)*** (1.743)***
Runo⁄ ￿ Gini 11.405 13.174 11.056 11.492
(4.735)** (3.518)*** (3.338)*** (3.196)***
Incumbent -0.293 -0.080
(0.032)*** (0.040)**
Years Included 1988 & 1992 1988 & 1996 1988 & 2000 1988 & 2004
Observations 4566 5070 5072 5072
# of Municipalities 2283 2535 2536 2536
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
13Table 7: Fixed E⁄ects (Allowing variation in Gini)
Dependent Variable: Number of Candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Runo⁄ -7.666 -12.547 -11.879 -13.212 -11.249
(2.634)*** (2.460)*** (2.372)*** (2.238)*** (1.293)***
Gini -0.865 -0.714 -1.289 0.228
(0.390)** (0.442) (0.427)*** (0.221)
Runo⁄ ￿ Gini 13.042 22.162 19.551 22.773 19.110
(4.744)*** (4.295)*** (4.174)*** (3.940)*** (2.305)***
Electorate -0.008 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.000)*
Incumbent -0.270 -0.019 -0.056
(0.036)*** (0.042) (0.019)***
Years Included 1988 & 1992 1988 & 1996 1988 & 2000 1988 & 2004 All Years
Observations 4530 5016 5018 5018 22580
# of Cities 2265 2508 2509 2509 5505
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02
Standard errors in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
Lastly, we run a placebo regression assuming mayoral elections in 1988 were already gov-
erned by the new rule. Since they were not, we expect the evidence presented above to vanish
from the regression. This is precisely what happens as one can note from Table 8 below. The
sign of the coe¢ cients are reversed: more heterogeneity in runo⁄ municipalities diminishes the
number of candidates, a fact inconsistent with theory and established evidence.
The fact that the coe¢ cients are of opposite sign in the placebo regressions means that the
pooled regressions are underestimating the impact of the interactive variable on the number of
candidates.
14Table 8: ￿Placebo￿regression
Dependent Variable: Number of Candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1992 1996 2000 2004
Runo⁄ 6.942 6.631 6.244 6.497
(2.409)*** (1.842)*** (1.672)*** (1.559)***
Gini 0.617 0.510 0.520 0.561
(0.514) (0.489) (0.486) (0.484)
Runo⁄ ￿ Gini -7.854 -6.860 -6.222 -6.746
(4.335)* (3.361)** (3.086)** (2.883)**
Electorate 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Observations 2265 2508 2509 2509
R-squared 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.25
Standard errors in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
4 Conclusion
Theory suggests the number of candidates should vary with the electoral structure. In par-
ticular, runo⁄ elections should entail more candidates than simple plurality when there is a
su¢ cient amount of heterogeneity among voters. Many empirical papers have lent credence to
this claim ￿rst put forth informally by Duverger.
However, most of them employ cross-country data and assume the electoral system to be
exogenously determined. Therefore, they are highly subject to endogeneity biases. Exploring
the exogenous change in electoral legislation imposed by the new Brazilian Constitution on
the country￿ s municipalities, and resorting to ￿xed e⁄ect estimations, we are able to avoid
these common endogeneity criticisms. Our ￿ndings corroborate the nuanced view that runo⁄
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